Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349, 11 (1993)

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Cite as: 507 U. S. 349 (1993)

Opinion of the Court

ular commercial transaction or act," and provides that "[t]he commercial character of an activity shall be determined by reference to the nature of the course of conduct or particular transaction or act, rather than by reference to its purpose." 28 U. S. C. § 1603(d). If this is a definition, it is one distinguished only by its diffidence; as we observed in our most recent case on the subject, it "leaves the critical term 'commercial' largely undefined." Republic of Argentina v. Welt-over, Inc., 504 U. S. 607, 612 (1992); see Donoghue, supra, at 499; Lowenfeld, Litigating a Sovereign Immunity Claim— The Haiti Case, 49 N. Y. U. L. Rev. 377, 435, n. 244 (1974) (commenting on then-draft Act) ("Start with 'activity,' proceed via 'conduct' or 'transaction' to 'character,' then refer to 'nature,' and then go back to 'commercial,' the term you started out to define in the first place"); G. Born & D. Westin, International Civil Litigation in United States Courts 479- 480 (2d ed. 1992). We do not, however, have the option to throw up our hands. The term has to be given some interpretation, and congressional diffidence necessarily results in judicial responsibility to determine what a "commercial activity" is for purposes of the Act.

We took up the task just last Term in Weltover, supra, which involved Argentina's unilateral refinancing of bonds it had issued under a plan to stabilize its currency. Bondholders sued Argentina in federal court, asserting jurisdiction under the third clause of § 1605(a)(2). In the course of holding the refinancing to be a commercial activity for purposes of the Act, we observed that the statute "largely codifies the so-called 'restrictive' theory of foreign sovereign immunity first endorsed by the State Department in 1952." 504 U. S., at 612. We accordingly held that the meaning of "commercial" for purposes of the Act must be the meaning Congress understood the restrictive theory to require at the time it passed the statute. See id., at 612-613.

Under the restrictive, as opposed to the "absolute," theory of foreign sovereign immunity, a state is immune from the

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