Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 33 (1993)

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442

CINCINNATI v. DISCOVERY NETWORK, INC.

Rehnquist, C. J., dissenting

marks omitted). Properly viewed, then, the city's prohibition against respondents' newsracks is directly related to its efforts to alleviate the problems caused by newsracks, since every newsrack that is removed from the city's sidewalks marginally enhances the safety of its streets and esthetics of its cityscape. This conclusion is not altered by the fact that the city has chosen to address its problem by banning only those newsracks that disseminate commercial speech, rather than regulating all newsracks alike.

Our commercial speech cases establish that localities may stop short of fully accomplishing their objectives without running afoul of the First Amendment. In Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, 478 U. S. 328, 342 (1986), where we upheld Puerto Rico's ban on promotional advertising of casino gambling aimed at Puerto Rico residents, we rejected the appellant's argument that the ban was invalid under Central Hudson because other types of gambling (e. g., horse racing) were permitted to be advertised to local residents. More to the point, in Metro-media, Inc. v. San Diego, 453 U. S. 490 (1981) (plurality opinion), where we upheld San Diego's ban of offsite billboard advertising, we rejected the appellants' argument that the ban was invalid under Central Hudson because it did not extend to onsite billboard advertising. See 453 U. S., at 511 ("[W]hether onsite advertising is permitted or not, the prohibition of offsite advertising is directly related to the stated objectives of traffic safety and esthetics. This is not altered by the fact that the ordinance is underinclusive because it permits onsite advertising"). See also City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U. S. 789, 810-811 (1984) (rejecting the argument that the city's prohibition against the posting of signs on public property could not be justified on esthetic grounds because it did not extend to the posting of signs on private property). Thus, the fact that Cincinnati's regulatory scheme is underin-

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