444
Rehnquist, C. J., dissenting
the converse holds true. It is not surprising, then, that the Court offers little in the way of precedent supporting its new rule. The cases it does cite involve challenges to the restriction of noncommercial speech in which we have refused to accept distinctions drawn between restricted and nonrestricted speech on the ground that they bore no relationship to the interests asserted for regulating the speech in the first place. See ante, at 424-425, citing Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N. Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U. S. 105, 120 (1991); Carey v. Brown, 447 U. S. 455, 465 (1980). Neither of these cases involved the regulation of commercial speech; nor did they involve a challenge to the permissibility of distinctions drawn between categories of speech that we have accorded different degrees of First Amendment protection.
The Court's reliance on Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp., see ante, at 426-428, is also misplaced. In that case we said that the Government's interest in "shield[ing] recipients of mail from materials that they are likely to find offensive" was invalid regardless of the type of speech—commercial or noncommercial—involved. See 463 U. S., at 71-72. By contrast, there can be no question here that the city's safety and esthetic interests justify its prohibition against respondents' newsracks. This at least is the teaching of Metromedia. There, seven Justices were of the view that San Diego's safety and esthetic interests were sufficient to justify its ban on offsite billboard advertising, even though the city's reason for regulating these billboards had nothing to do with the content of the advertisements they displayed. See 453 U. S., 507-510 (opinion of White, J., joined by Stewart, Marshall, and Powell, JJ.); id., at 552-553 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part); id., at 559-561, 563 (Burger, C. J., dissenting); id., at 569-570 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Without even attempting to reconcile Metromedia, the Court now suggests that commercial speech is only subject to lesser protection when it is being regulated because of its content (or adverse effects stemming therefrom). See ante, at 416, n. 11, 425-426,
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