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were, however, entirely proper. Such silence is probative and does not rest on any implied assurance by law enforcement authorities that it will carry no penalty. Pp. 627-629. (b) Doyle error fits squarely into the category of constitutional violations characterized by this Court as "trial error." See Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U. S. 279, 307. Such error occurs during the presentation of the case to the jury, and is amenable to harmless-error analysis because it may be quantitatively assessed in the context of other evidence to determine its effect on the trial. See id., at 307-308. This Court has consistently applied the Chapman standard in reviewing claims of constitutional error of the trial type on direct review of state and federal criminal proceedings. Pp. 629-630. (c) It is for the Court to determine what harmless-error standard applies on collateral review of Brecht's Doyle claim. Although the Court has applied the Chapman standard in a handful of federal habeas cases, stare decisis does not preclude adoption of the Kotteakos standard here, since the decisions in question never squarely addressed, but merely assumed, Chapman's applicability on collateral review. Nor has Congress provided express guidance on the question. The federal habeas statute is silent as to the applicable standard, and while the federal harmless-error statute appears to echo the Kotteakos standard, it has been limited in its application to claims of nonconstitutional error in federal criminal cases. In line with the traditional rule, the Court finds no reason to draw inferences from Congress' failure to enact post-Chapman proposals that would have provided a less stringent harmless-error standard on collateral review of constitutional error. Pp. 630-633. (d) The Kotteakos standard is better tailored to the nature and purpose of collateral review than the Chapman standard, and is more likely to promote the considerations underlying this Court's recent habeas jurisprudence. In recognition of the historical distinction between direct review as the principal way to challenge a conviction and collateral review as an extraordinary remedy whose role is secondary and limited, the Court has often applied different standards on habeas than on direct review. It scarcely seems logical to require federal habeas courts to engage in the same approach that Chapman requires of state courts on direct review, since the latter courts are fully qualified to identify constitutional error and are often better situated to evaluate its prejudicial effect on the trial process. Absent affirmative evidence that state-court judges are ignoring their oath, Brecht's argument is unpersuasive that such courts will respond to the application of Kotteakos on federal habeas by violating their Article VI duty to uphold the Constitution. In any event, the additional deterrent effect, if any, of applying Chapman on federal habeas is outweighed by the costs of that application,
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