Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 32 (1993)

Page:   Index   Previous  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  Next

650

BRECHT v. ABRAHAMSON

O'Connor, J., dissenting

Justice Blackmun, dissenting.

I agree that "today's decision cannot be supported even under Stone's own terms," ante, at 646 (White, J., dissenting). Therefore, I join Justice White's dissent in its entirety.

Justice O'Connor, dissenting.

I have no dispute with the Court's observation that "collateral review is different from direct review." Ante, at 633. Just as the federal courts may decline to adjudicate certain issues of federal law on habeas because of prudential concerns, see Withrow v. Williams, post, at 686; post, at 699-700 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), so too may they resolve specific claims on habeas using different and more lenient standards than those applicable on direct review, see, e. g., Teague v. Lane, 489 U. S. 288, 299-310 (1989) (habeas claims adjudicated under the law prevailing at time conviction became final and not on the basis of intervening changes of law). But decisions concerning the Great Writ "warrant restraint," Withrow, post, at 700 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), for we ought not take lightly alteration of that " 'fundamental safeguard against unlawful custody,' " post, at 697-698 (quoting Fay v. Noia, 372 U. S. 391, 449 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting)).

In my view, restraint should control our decision today. The issue before us is not whether we should remove from the cognizance of the federal courts on habeas a discrete prophylactic rule unrelated to the truthfinding function of trial, as was the case in Stone v. Powell, 428 U. S. 465 (1976), and more recently in Withrow v. Williams, post, p. 680. Rather, we are asked to alter a standard that not only finds application in virtually every case of error but that also may be critical to our faith in the reliability of the criminal process. Because I am not convinced that the principles governing the exercise of our habeas powers—federalism, finality, and fairness—counsel against applying Chapman's harmless-error standard on collateral review, I would adhere to our

Page:   Index   Previous  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  Next

Last modified: October 4, 2007