Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 37 (1993)

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Cite as: 507 U. S. 619 (1993)

O'Connor, J., dissenting

But even if the Court's holding were limited to errors divorced from reliability concerns, the decision nevertheless would be unwise from the standpoint of judicial administration. Like Justice White, I do not believe we should turn our habeas jurisprudence into a "patchwork" of rules and exceptions without strong justification. Ante, at 649 (dissenting opinion). The interest of efficiency, always relevant to the scope of habeas relief, see, e. g., Stone, 428 U. S., at 491, n. 31; Withrow, post, at 693-694; post, at 708-713 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), favors simplification of legal inquiries, not their multiplication. A rule requiring the courts to distinguish between errors that affect accuracy and those that do not, however, would open up a whole new frontier for litigation and decision. In each case, the litigants would brief and federal judges would be required to decide whether the particular error asserted relates to accuracy. Given the number of constitutional rules we have recognized and the virtually limitless ways in which they might be transgressed, I cannot imagine that the benefits brought by such litigation could outweigh the costs it would impose.

In fact, even on its own terms the Court's decision buys the federal courts a lot of trouble. From here on out, prisoners undoubtedly will litigate—and judges will be forced to decide—whether each error somehow might be wedged into the narrow potential exception the Court mentions in a footnote today. Moreover, since the Court only mentions the possibility of an exception, all concerned must also address whether the exception exists at all. I see little justification for imposing these novel and potentially difficult questions on our already overburdened justice system.

Nor does the majority demonstrate that the Kotteakos standard will ease the burden of conducting harmless-error review in those cases to which it does apply. Indeed, as Justice Stevens demonstrates in his concurrence, Kotteakos is unlikely to lighten the load of the federal judiciary at all. The courts still must review the entire record in search of

655

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