Keene Corp. v. United States, 508 U.S. 200, 12 (1993)

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Cite as: 508 U. S. 200 (1993)

Opinion of the Court

appeal. Id., at 539-540. Later that year, we had the case of a plaintiff seeking a writ of mandamus to stop the Court of Claims from reinstating a suit it had dismissed earlier, without prejudice, on the plaintiff's own motion. Ex parte Skinner & Eddy Corp., 265 U. S. 86 (1924). Skinner & Eddy had sued the United States in the Court of Claims for nearly $17.5 million; "[t]he largest item of the claim was for anticipated profits on 25 vessels" covered by an order, later canceled, by the United States Emergency Fleet Corporation. Id., at 91. After the Court of Claims had granted its motion to dismiss, Skinner & Eddy sued the Emergency Fleet Corporation in state court "on substantially the same causes of action as those sued for in the Court of Claims." Id., at 92. There was no question that the factual predicate of each action was the same, except for the omission from the state court action of any demand for anticipated profits, thus limiting the damages sought to $9.1 million. We issued the writ of mandamus, holding that § 154 prevented the Court of Claims from exercising jurisdiction over the claims it had dismissed earlier, given the intervening state court suit.5

A few years later, the Court of Claims settled a key question only foreshadowed by Skinner & Eddy: whether § 154 applied when the Court of Claims action and the "other" suit proceeded under different legal theories. In British American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 89 Ct. Cl. 438 (1939) (per curiam), after the plaintiff had surrendered his gold bullion to the Government (in compliance with executive orders and regulations that took this country off the gold

5 We have had one other encounter with this statute, in Matson Navigation Co. v. United States, 284 U. S. 352 (1932), where we relied on the plain words of § 154 to hold that the statute did not apply where the Court of Claims plaintiff had brought suit in another court against the United States, rather than against an agent of the United States, for the same claim. When Congress reenacted the statute in 1948, it added the phrase "against the United States" to close this loophole. See Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 942; Johns-Manville Corp. v. United States, 855 F. 2d 1556, 1566-1567, and n. 15 (CA Fed. 1988).

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