Keene Corp. v. United States, 508 U.S. 200, 22 (1993)

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Cite as: 508 U. S. 200 (1993)

Stevens, J., dissenting

dismissed if the plaintiff chose not to abandon the claim pending elsewhere.

In any event, when the text of § 1500 was revised in 1948, Congress removed the prohibition on filing. The Court nevertheless assumes that the section should be construed as originally drafted, because Congress did not intend the 1948 revisions of the Judicial Code to make substantive changes in the law. See ante, at 209. In fact, the 1948 revision did work a significant substantive change by enlarging the class of suits subject to dismissal to include suits against the United States, as well as suits against its agents. See ante, at 212, n. 6; Matson Navigation Co. v. United States, 284 U. S. 352, 355-356 (1932); see also Schwartz, Section 1500 of the Judicial Code and Duplicate Suits Against the Government and Its Agents, 55 Geo. L. J. 573, 579-580 (1967). But even if it were the case that Congress intended no substantive change in 1948, that would mean only that the present text is the best evidence of what the law has always meant, and that the language of the prior version cannot be relied upon to support a different reading.

In my judgment, the Court of Claims properly construed § 1500 in 1966 when it held that the provision merely requires claimants to choose between alternative pending claims before proceeding to trial. See Brown, 175 Ct. Cl., at 348, 358 F. 2d, at 1004. The statute limits the power of the Court of Federal Claims to render judgments, and thus the ability of a plaintiff to prosecute simultaneous actions against the Government, but it does not prevent the Court of Federal Claims from allowing a case to remain on its docket until the claimant has made the required election. Even if I did not agree with this interpretation of § 1500, however, I would nevertheless endorse it here, as litigants have a right to rely on a longstanding and reasoned judicial construction of an important statute that Congress has not seen fit to alter. See McNally v. United States, 483 U. S.

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