224
Syllabus
a weapon but as an item of barter or commerce. Thus, even if § 924(c)(1), as originally enacted, applied only to use of a firearm during crimes of violence, it is clear from the face of the statute that "use" is not presently limited to use as a weapon, but is broad enough to cover use for trade. Pp. 227-237. (b) Smith's use of his firearm was "during and in relation to" a drug trafficking crime. Smith does not, and cannot, deny that the alleged use occurred "during" such a crime. And there can be little doubt that his use was "in relation to" the offense. That phrase has a dictionary meaning of "with reference to" or "as regards" and, at a minimum, clarifies that the firearm must have some purpose or effect with respect to the drug crime. Thus, its presence or involvement cannot be the result of accident or coincidence, and it at least must facilitate or have the purpose of facilitating the drug offense. Here, the firearm was an integral part of the drug transaction, which would not have been possible without it. There is no reason why Congress would not have wanted its language to cover this situation, since the introduction of guns into drug transactions dramatically heightens the danger to society, whether the guns are used as a medium of exchange or as protection for the transactions or dealers. Pp. 237-239. (c) Smith's invocation of the rule of lenity is rejected. Imposing a postnarrower construction of § 924(c)(1) than the one herein adopted would do violence not only to the statute's plain language and structure, but also to its purpose of addressing the heightened risk of violence and death that accompanies the introduction of firearms to drug trafficking offenses. Pp. 239-241.
957 F. 2d 835, affirmed.
O'Connor, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and White, Blackmun, Kennedy, and Thomas, JJ., joined. Blackmun, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 241. Scalia, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Stevens and Souter, JJ., joined, post, p. 241.
Gary Kollin, by appointment of the Court, 506 U. S. 938, argued the cause and filed a brief for petitioner.
Thomas G. Hungar argued the cause for the United States. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Starr, Assistant Attorney General Mueller, Deputy Solicitor General Bryson, and John F. DePue.
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