Cite as: 508 U. S. 22 (1993)
Opinion of the Court
entering into a collective-bargaining agreement with the county.10 Accordingly, the terms and conditions of petitioners' employment are included in individual form agreements signed by each employee. These agreements incorporate by reference the county's regulations providing that deputies shall receive 11/2 hours of compensatory time for each hour of overtime work.11
Petitioners filed this action in 1986, alleging, inter alia,12
that the county violated the Act by paying for overtime work with comp time, rather than overtime pay, absent an agreement with their representative authorizing the substitution. Petitioners contended that they were "covered" by subclause (i) of subsection 7(o)(2)(A) by virtue of their union represen-10 As the Court of Appeals stated: " Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 5154c prohibits any political subdivision from entering into a collective bargaining agreement with a labor organization unless the political subdivision has adopted the Fire and Police Employee Relations Act. Harris County has not adopted that Act; thus, under article 5154c the County has no authority to bargain with the Union." 956 F. 2d 516, 519 (CA5 1992). The court went on to clarify that "Texas law prohibits any bilateral agreement between a city and a bargaining agent, whether the agreement is labeled a collective bargaining agreement or something else. Under Texas law, the County could not enter into any agreement with the Union." Id., at 520 (emphasis in original).
The District Court interpreted Texas law the same way. Merritt v. Klevenhagen, Civ. Action No. 88-1298 (SD Tex., Sept. 5, 1990), pp. 3-4, reprinted in App. to Pet. for Cert. 18a. Our decision is premised on the normal assumption that the Court of Appeals and the District Court have correctly construed the relevant rules of Texas law. See Bishop v. Wood, 426 U. S. 341, 346, and n. 10 (1976) (citing cases).
11 Merritt, Civ. Action No. 88-1298, p. 2, reprinted in App. to Pet. for Cert. 17a.
12 The District Court granted summary judgment for the county on two additional claims: that the county failed to include longevity pay in its overtime pay calculations, and that the county excluded nonmandated firearms qualification time from the calculation of number of hours worked. The Court of Appeals affirmed with respect to the former and remanded for further proceedings with respect to the latter claim. 956 F. 2d, at 520-523. Neither claim is before us today.
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