Moreau v. Klevenhagen, 508 U.S. 22, 12 (1993)

Page:   Index   Previous  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  Next

Cite as: 508 U. S. 22 (1993)

Opinion of the Court

individual comp time agreements under subclause (ii).15

This permissive interpretation of subsection 7(o), however, is at odds with the limiting phrase of subclause (ii) at issue here. See supra, at 31. Had Congress intended such an open-ended authorization of the use of comp time, it surely would have said so more simply, forgoing the elaborate sub-clause structure that purports to restrict use of individual agreements to a limited class of employees. Respondents' broad interpretation of the subsection 7(o) exception is also in some tension with the well-established rule that "exemptions from the [FLSA] are to be narrowly construed." See, e. g., Mitchell v. Kentucky Finance Co., 359 U. S. 290, 295- 296 (1959).

At the same time, however, we find equally implausible a reading of the statutory text that would deem employees "covered" by subclause (i) whenever they select a representative, whether or not the representative has the ability to enter into the kind of agreement described in that sub-clause. If there is no possibility of reaching an agreement under subclause (i), then that subclause cannot logically be read as applicable. In other words, "employees . . . covered by subclause (i)" must, at a minimum, be employees who conceivably could receive comp time pursuant to the agreement contemplated by that subclause.

The most plausible reading of the phrase "employees . . . covered by subclause (i)" is, in our view, neither of the extreme alternatives described above. Rather, the phrase is

15 Indeed, even an employer who is party to a collective-bargaining agreement with its employees may be permitted to take advantage of sub-clause (ii) under respondents' construction. Because subclause (i) describes only those agreements that authorize the use of comp time, see supra, at 31-32, a collective-bargaining agreement silent on the subject, or even one prohibiting use of comp time altogether, would not constitute a subclause (i) agreement. Accordingly, employees bound by such an agreement would not be "covered by subclause (i)" under respondents' theory, and their employer would be free to provide comp time instead of overtime pay pursuant to individual employee agreements.

33

Page:   Index   Previous  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  Next

Last modified: October 4, 2007