Gilmore v. Taylor, 508 U.S. 333, 8 (1993)

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340

GILMORE v. TAYLOR

Opinion of the Court

the basis for federal habeas relief if it announces a "new rule." Graham v. Collins, 506 U. S. 461, 466-467 (1993); Stringer v. Black, 503 U. S. 222, 227 (1992); Teague, supra, at 305-311 (plurality opinion). Though we have offered various formulations of what constitutes a new rule, put "meaningfully for the majority of cases, a decision announces a new rule ' "if the result was not dictated by precedent existing at the time the defendant's conviction became final." ' " Butler v. McKellar, 494 U. S. 407, 412 (1990) (quoting Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U. S. 302, 314 (1989), in turn quoting Teague, supra, at 301 (emphasis in original)); see also Graham, supra, at 467; Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U. S. 227, 234 (1990); Saffle v. Parks, 494 U. S. 484, 488 (1990); Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U. S. 302, 329 (1989). "The 'new rule' principle . . . validates reasonable, good-faith interpretations of existing precedents made by state courts," 494 U. S., at 414, and thus effectuates the States' interest in the finality of criminal convictions and fosters comity between federal and state courts.

We begin our analysis with the actual flaw found by the Falconer court in the challenged jury instructions. It was not that they somehow lessened the State's burden of proof below that constitutionally required by cases such as In re Winship, 397 U. S. 358 (1970); nor was it that the instructions affirmatively misstated applicable state law. (The Court of Appeals in no way relied upon People v. Reddick, supra, which the Illinois Supreme Court had subsequently held was subject to prospective application only. People v. Flowers, 138 Ill. 2d 218, 561 N. E. 2d 674 (1990).) Rather, the flaw identified by the Falconer court was that when the jury instructions were read consecutively, with the elements of murder set forth before the elements of voluntary manslaughter, a juror could conclude that the defendant was guilty of murder after applying the elements of that offense without continuing on to decide whether the elements of voluntary manslaughter were also made out, so as to justify returning a verdict on that lesser offense instead.

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