Cite as: 508 U. S. 333 (1993)
O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment
441, 442 (1992). In other words, the court concluded that there was a reasonable likelihood that the jury never considered Taylor's defense of sudden and provoked passion, even though the trial court thought there was sufficient evidence of the defense for the issue to reach the jury and even though the State bore the burden of proving its absence beyond a reasonable doubt. This, the court held, violated due process. Id., at 450.
The Court of Appeals, however, understood that our decision in Teague v. Lane, 489 U. S. 288 (1989) (plurality opinion), bars the announcement of new rules on habeas corpus. 954 F. 2d, at 451. Accordingly, it examined our precedents to determine whether its decision was "dictated" by our prior decisions. In so doing, the court construed our cases in Boyde v. California, 494 U. S. 370 (1990), and Connecticut v. Johnson, 460 U. S. 73 (1983) (plurality opinion), as compelling its conclusion that the instructions used in Taylor's case violated due process. 954 F. 2d, at 452-453. It therefore held that its rule was not "new" and ordered that a writ of habeas corpus issue unless Taylor was retried within 120 days. Id., at 453.
I agree with the majority today that the rule the Court of Appeals announced was at least susceptible to debate among reasonable jurists. See Butler v. McKellar, 494 U. S. 407, 415 (1990). For that reason, I agree that under Teague a federal court cannot issue a writ of habeas corpus based on the ambiguous instructions in dispute here. In so deciding, however, I would not reach out to decide the merits of the rule, nor would I construe our cases so narrowly as the Court does. For that reason, I write separately.
Prior to Boyde, we phrased the standard for reviewing jury instructions in a variety of ways, not all of which were consistent. Compare Mills v. Maryland, 486 U. S. 367, 384 (1988) (constitutional error occurs when there is a "substantial probability" the instructions precluded consideration of constitutionally relevant evidence), with Sandstrom v. Mon-
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