Gilmore v. Taylor, 508 U.S. 333, 21 (1993)

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Cite as: 508 U. S. 333 (1993)

Blackmun, J., dissenting

345. The second Teague exception permits the retroactive application of " 'watershed rules of criminal procedure' implicating the fundamental fairness and accuracy of the criminal proceeding," Saffle v. Parks, 494 U. S. 484, 495 (1990) (quoting Teague, 489 U. S., at 311). Unlike the Court, I am fully persuaded that this exception does apply in this case. Therefore, even assuming, arguendo, that the majority is correct in concluding that Taylor asks this Court to announce a "new rule," Teague does not preclude the retroactive application of that rule.

Taylor argues that the substantive criminal law existing at the time of a defendant's alleged offense must be the law that governs the trial of that offense. I believe that he is correct and that the principle he asserts is a fundamental one. I therefore would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

I

At the time that Taylor was tried for the "murder" of Scott Siniscalchi, Illinois law defined murder and voluntary manslaughter as two distinct crimes, albeit with two elements in common. To be guilty of either crime, a defendant had to have (1) caused the death of the victim, and (2) intended to kill or cause great bodily harm to the victim.1 The distinction between voluntary manslaughter and murder at the time of Taylor's offense was that a defendant who acted either "under a sudden and intense passion resulting from serious provocation," or under an unreasonable (but honest) belief that deadly force was justified to prevent the defendant's own imminent death or great bodily harm, was guilty of voluntary manslaughter but not guilty of murder. Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 38, ¶ 9-2 (1985). In other words, under Illinois law at the time of Taylor's offense, a person who killed

1 The intent element would also be satisfied if the defendant knew that his acts would cause or create a strong probability of death or great bodily harm, or if the defendant had been attempting or committing a forcible felony at the time. See Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 38, ¶¶ 9-1(2) and (3) (1985).

353

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