Gilmore v. Taylor, 508 U.S. 333, 23 (1993)

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Cite as: 508 U. S. 333 (1993)

Blackmun, J., dissenting

99. He accordingly suggested that the judge include an instruction explaining that Taylor's provocation claim could serve to constitute a complete defense to the murder charge. Id., at 99. The prosecutor indicated that he had raised this possibility because "I just don't want to knowingly create error here." Id., at 101. The trial judge declined the suggestion and responded to the prosecutor's concern: "We're not doing it knowingly; we're doing it out of ignorance." Ibid.

After deliberations, the jury announced that it had found Taylor guilty of murder. It then returned a signed verdict form to that effect. Id., at 131, 137. The jury never mentioned the manslaughter charge and returned unsigned both the guilty and not-guilty forms for that offense. Id., at 139-140.

II

A jury instruction is unconstitutional if there is a "reasonable likelihood that the jury has applied the challenged instruction in a way that prevents the consideration of constitutionally relevant evidence." Boyde v. California, 494 U. S. 370, 380 (1990).2 I explain in greater detail below why testimony that demonstrates that a defendant killed under provocation is constitutionally relevant evidence in a murder trial in Illinois. A threshold question, however, is whether the jury's instructions in this case created a reasonable likelihood that the jury would not consider such provocation evidence.

No one appears to contest the proposition that a jury of lay people would not understand from the instructions that it should find Taylor not guilty of murder if it concluded that he acted under provocation. The judge explained to the

2 The Court implies, ante, at 342, that the Boyde standard might be confined to capital cases. The Court's citation of Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U. S. 62 (1991), however, belies that implication, because Estelle v. McGuire reaffirmed the Boyde standard and was itself not a capital case. See also ante, at 348 (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment).

355

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