Gilmore v. Taylor, 508 U.S. 333, 30 (1993)

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362

GILMORE v. TAYLOR

Blackmun, J., dissenting

to the death penalty, because they do not want to set a guilty person free. In other words, the failure to provide a lesser included offense instruction in the capital context is a problem only to the extent that we fear that jurors will choose to disregard or nullify their reasonable-doubt instruction.

In Taylor's case, the concern is just the opposite—that the jurors will follow their instructions and thereby convict the defendant of murder because they are ignorant of the fact that provocation reduces the offense to voluntary manslaughter. The failure to include a proper voluntary manslaughter instruction literally distorts the definition of murder by extending it to include voluntary manslaughter and thereby misinforming the jury.

Whether or not we would choose to extend Beck and its presumption of jury nullification to the noncapital defendant has no bearing on the outcome of this case. The right at issue here is one premised upon the notion that jurors faithfully follow what they understand to be their instructions. This premise clearly operates in the capital and noncapital contexts alike. See Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U. S. 200, 211 (1987).

B

Through his instructions, then, the trial judge in this case applied an ex post facto murder law to Taylor and thereby misled the jury as to the definition of murder. But the trial judge also violated another of Taylor's constitutional rights. When the judge prevented Taylor's jurors from considering his provocation defense, the judge deprived Taylor of his Sixth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment right to a fair trial.

The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution guarantee every criminal defendant the right to remain silent. Our precedents have explained that this right precludes the State from calling the defendant as a witness for the prosecution. See, e. g., South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U. S. 553, 563 (1983) (the "classic Fifth Amendment viola-

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