Gilmore v. Taylor, 508 U.S. 333, 31 (1993)

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Cite as: 508 U. S. 333 (1993)

Blackmun, J., dissenting

tion" consists of requiring the defendant to testify at his own criminal trial); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U. S. 1 (1964) (the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause incorporates the Fifth Amendment right to remain silent against the States). The State must provide all evidence necessary to a conviction if the defendant chooses not to testify.

Taylor gave up this important right and took the witness stand to testify about his crime. He evidently did so to avail himself of the provocation defense provided by Illinois law. Taylor admitted under oath that he broke into his former wife's home and intentionally and fatally stabbed Scott Siniscalchi. App. 80-81. He also testified, however, that he had been provoked by the victim. Id., at 76-81. In its closing argument, the defense therefore asked the jury to find that he had acted under sudden and intense passion when he killed Siniscalchi and therefore was not guilty of murder. Id., at 112-121.

When the judge instructed the jurors, he effectively told them to disregard Taylor's provocation testimony. Absent that testimony, of course, the most important evidence before the jurors when they deliberated was that Taylor had taken the stand and had sworn to them that his actions violated both elements of the murder statute. As far as the jurors could tell, Taylor had confessed to the crime of murder in open court.

Taylor never indicated a desire to plead guilty to murder. Indeed, he offered testimony that tended to show that he was innocent of murder. Yet the trial judge failed to follow the very statute that had prompted Taylor to testify. By so doing, the judge effectively transformed exculpatory testimony into a plea of guilty to murder. When a defendant intentionally pleads guilty to an offense, he has a constitutional right to be informed about the consequences of his plea. See Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U. S. 504, 509 (1984); Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U. S. 422, 436 (1983). Taylor, however, was never apprised of the consequences of his testi-

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