Cite as: 509 U. S. 155 (1993)
Blackmun, J., dissenting
meaning for "return." 12 It does so not by analyzing Article 33, the provision that inspired the 1980 amendments,13 but
by reference to a lone case from this Court that is not even mentioned in the legislative history and that had been on the books a full 22 years before the amendments' enactment.
In Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U. S. 185 (1958), this Court decided that aliens paroled into the United States from detention at the border were not "within the United States" for purposes of the former § 243(h) and thus were not entitled to its benefits. Pointing to this decision, the majority offers the negative inference that Congress' removal of the words "within the United States" was meant only to extend a right of nonreturn to those in exclusion proceedings. But nothing in Leng May Ma even remotely suggests that the only persons not "within the United States" are those involved in exclusion proceedings. Indeed, such a suggestion would have been ridiculous. Nor does the narrow concept of exclusion relate in any obvious way to the amendment's broad phrase "return any alien."
The problems with the majority's Leng May Ma theory run deeper, however. When Congress in 1980 removed the
12 The word "return" is used throughout the INA; in no instance is there any indication that the word has a specialized meaning. See, e. g., 8 U. S. C. §§ 1101(a)(27)(A) ("special immigrant" is one lawfully admitted "who is returning from a temporary visit abroad" (emphasis added)); 1101(a)(42)(A) ("refugee" is a person outside his own country who is "unable or unwilling to return to" his country because of persecution (emphasis added)); 1182(a)(7)(B)(i)(I) (nonimmigrant who does not possess passport authorizing him "to return to the country from which" he came is excludable (emphasis added)); 1252(a)(1) (deportable alien's parole may be revoked and the alien "returned to custody" (emphasis added)); 1353 (travel expenses will be paid for INS officers who "become eligible for voluntary retirement and return to the United States" (emphasis added)). It is axiomatic that "identical words used in different parts of the same act are intended to have the same meaning." Atlantic Cleaners & Dyers, Inc. v. United States, 286 U. S. 427, 433 (1932).
13 Indeed, reasoning backwards, the majority actually looks to the American scheme to illuminate the treaty. See ante, at 180-181.
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