Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 52 (1993)

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206

SALE v. HAITIAN CENTERS COUNCIL, INC.

Blackmun, J., dissenting

doubt: A territorial restriction has been deliberately deleted from the statute.

Even where congressional intent is unexpressed, however, a statute must be assessed according to its intended scope. The primary basis for the application of the presumption (besides the desire—not relevant here—to avoid conflict with the laws of other nations) is "the commonsense notion that Congress generally legislates with domestic concerns in mind." Smith v. United States, 507 U. S. 197, 204, n. 5 (1993). Where that notion seems unjustified or unenlightening, however, generally worded laws covering varying subject matters are routinely applied extraterritorially. See, e. g., Hellenic Lines Ltd. v. Rhoditis, 398 U. S. 306 (1970) (extraterritorial application of the Jones Act); Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U. S. 280 (1952) (Lanham Act applies extraterritorially); Kawakita v. United States, 343 U. S. 717 (1952) (extraterritorial application of treason statute); Ford v. United States, 273 U. S. 593, 602 (1927) (applying National Prohibition Act to high seas despite its silence on issue of extraterritoriality).

In this case we deal with a statute that regulates a distinctively international subject matter: immigration, nationalities, and refugees. Whatever force the presumption may have with regard to a primarily domestic statute evaporates in this context. There is no danger that the Congress that enacted the Refugee Act was blind to the fact that the laws it was crafting had implications beyond this Nation's borders. The "commonsense notion" that Congress was looking inwards—perfectly valid in a case involving the Federal Tort Claims Act, such as Smith,—cannot be reasonably applied to the Refugee Act of 1980.

In this regard, the majority's dictum that the presumption has "special force" when we construe "statutory provisions that may involve foreign and military affairs for which the President has unique responsibility," ante, at 188, is completely wrong. The presumption that Congress did not in-

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