Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 36 (1993)

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244

BROOKE GROUP LTD. v. BROWN & WILLIAMSON TOBACCO CORP.

Stevens, J., dissenting

day trial, the jury agreed, and awarded Liggett substantial damages. The Court of Appeals, however, found that Liggett could not succeed on its claim, because B&W, as an independent actor controlling only 12% of the national cigarette market, could not injure competition. Liggett Group, Inc. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 964 F. 2d 335, 340-342 (CA4 1992).

Today, the Court properly rejects that holding. See ante, at 229-230. Instead of remanding the case to the Court of Appeals to resolve the other issues raised by the parties, however, the Court goes on to review portions of the voluminous trial record, and comes to the conclusion that the evidence does not support the jury's finding that B&W's price discrimination "had a reasonable possibility of injuring competition." 2 In my opinion the evidence is plainly sufficient to support that finding.

or knowingly receives the benefit of such discrimination, or with customers of either of them . . . ." 15 U. S. C. §13(a).

2 The jury gave an affirmative answer to the following special issue: "1. Did Brown & Williamson engage in price discrimination that had a reasonable possibility of injuring competition in the cigarette market as a whole in the United States?" App. 27.

The jury made its finding after being instructed that "injury to competition" means "the injury to consumer welfare which results when a competitor is able to raise and to maintain prices in a market or well-defined submarket above competitive levels. In order to injure competition in the cigarette market as a whole, Brown & Williamson must be able to create a real possibility of both driving out rivals by loss-creating price cutting and then holding on to that advantage to recoup losses by raising and maintaining prices at higher than competitive levels.

"You must remember that the Robinson-Patman Act was designed to protect competition rather than just competitors and, therefore, injury to competition does not mean injury to a competitor. Liggett & Myers can not satisfy this element simply by showing that they were injured by Brown & Williamson's conduct. To satisfy this element, Liggett & Myers must show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Brown & Williamson's conduct had a reasonable possibility of injuring competition in the cigarette market and not just a reasonable possibility of injuring a competitor in the cigarette market." Id., at 829-830.

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