Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 43 (1993)

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Cite as: 509 U. S. 209 (1993)

Stevens, J., dissenting

those facts, see n. 3, supra, justified the finding by the jury that B&W's discriminatory pricing campaign "had a reasonable possibility of injuring competition," see supra, at 244, and n. 2.

II

The Sherman Act, 26 Stat. 209, enacted in 1890, the Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 730, enacted in 1914, and the Robinson-Patman Act, which amended the Clayton Act in 1936, all serve the purpose of protecting competition. Because they have a common goal, the statutes are similar in many respects. All three prohibit the predatory practice of deliberately selling below cost to discipline a competitor, either to drive the competitor out of business or to raise prices to a level that will enable the predator to recover its losses and, in the long run, earn additional profits. Sales below cost and anticompetitive intent are elements of the violation of all three statutes. Neither of those elements, however, is at issue in this case. See ante, at 231 (record contains sufficient evidence of anticompetitive intent and below-cost pricing).

The statutes do differ significantly with respect to one element of the violation, the competitive consequences of predatory conduct. Even here, however, the three statutes have one thing in common: Not one of them requires proof that a predatory plan has actually succeeded in accomplishing its objective. Section 1 of the Sherman Act requires proof of a conspiracy. It is the joint plan to restrain trade, however, and not its success, that is prohibited by § 1. Nash v. United States, 229 U. S. 373, 378 (1913). Section 2 of the Sherman Act applies to independent conduct, and may be violated when there is a "dangerous probability" that an attempt to achieve monopoly power will succeed. Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U. S. 375, 396 (1905). The Clayton Act goes beyond the "dangerous probability" standard to cover price discrimination "where the effect of such discrimination may be to substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce." § 2, 38 Stat. 730.

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