464
Opinion of Stevens, J.
the conduct to which the injured parties have been subjected." See n. 29, supra.
We agree with TXO that the emphasis on the wealth of the wrongdoer increased the risk that the award may have been influenced by prejudice against large corporations, a risk that is of special concern when the defendant is a nonresident. We also do not understand the reference in the instruction to "additional compensation." We note, however, that in Haslip we referred to the "financial position" of the defendant as one factor that could be taken into account in assessing punitive damages, see n. 28, supra. We also note that TXO did not squarely argue in the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals that these aspects of the jury instruction violated the Due Process Clause, see Brief for Appellant in No. 20281 (W. Va. Sup. Ct.), pp. 44-48,30 possibly because many States permit the jury to take account of the defendant's wealth.31 Because TXO's constitutional attack on the jury instructions was not properly presented to the highest court of the State, Bankers Life & Casualty Co. v. Crenshaw, 486 U. S. 71, 77-80 (1988), we do not pass on it.
The only basis for criticizing the trial judge's review of the punitive damages award is that he did not articulate his reasons for upholding it. He did, however, give counsel an adequate hearing on TXO's postverdict motions, and during one colloquy indicated his agreement with the jury's appraisal of
30 In fact, in its brief before that court, petitioner stated that "[i]t is clear under West Virginia law that the financial standing of the defendant is an element to be taken into consideration in determining the proper measure of punitive or exemplary damages." Brief for Appellant in No. 20281 (W. Va. Sup. Ct.), p. 37 (emphasis in original). There is no hint in that brief that petitioner thought that this state rule violated due process.
31 See, e. g., Wagner v. McDaniels, 9 Ohio St. 3d 184, 186-187, 459 N. E. 2d 561, 564 (1984); Gamble v. Stevenson, 305 S. C. 104, 111, n. 3, 406 S. E. 2d 350, 354, n. 3 (1991); Lunsford v. Morris, 746 S. W. 2d 471, 473 (Tex. 1988); Viking Ins. Co. v. Jester, 310 S. C. 317, 332, 836 S. W. 2d 371, 379 (Ark. 1992).
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