466
Opinion of Kennedy, J.
ponent of the Due Process Clause is satisfied if prior law fairly indicated that a punitive damages award might be imposed in response to egregiously tortious conduct. Haslip, 499 U. S., at 24, n. 12. Prior law, in West Virginia and elsewhere, unquestionably did so.
The judgment of the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals is affirmed.
It is so ordered.
Justice Kennedy, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.
I concur in the plurality's statement of the case and in Part IV of the plurality opinion, in which the plurality holds that the judicial procedures that were followed in awarding punitive damages against TXO fulfilled the constitutional requirement of due process of law. I am not in full agreement, however, with the plurality's discussion of the substantive requirements of the Due Process Clause in Parts II and III, in which it concentrates on whether the punitive damages award was " 'grossly excessive.' " Ante, at 458, 462. I agree that the approaches proposed by the parties to this case are unsatisfactory, see ante, at 456-458, but I do not believe that the plurality's replacement, a general focus on the " 'reasonableness' " of the award, ante, at 458, quoting Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U. S. 1, 18 (1991), is a significant improvement. To ask whether a particular award of punitive damages is grossly excessive begs the question: excessive in relation to what? The answer excessive in relation to the conduct of the tortfeasor may be correct, but it is unhelpful, for we are still bereft of any standard by which to compare the punishment to the malefaction that gave rise to it. A reviewing court employing this formulation comes close to relying upon nothing more than its own subjective reaction to a particular punitive
satory damages before it can award punitive damages. See 186 W. Va., at 667, 413 S. E. 2d, at 908.
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