510
Opinion of the Court
case, then a question of fact does remain, which the trier of fact will be called upon to answer.3
If, on the other hand, the defendant has succeeded in carrying its burden of production, the McDonnell Douglas framework—with its presumptions and burdens—is no longer relevant. To resurrect it later, after the trier of fact has determined that what was "produced" to meet the burden of production is not credible, flies in the face of our holding in Burdine that to rebut the presumption "[t]he defendant need not persuade the court that it was actually motivated by the proffered reasons." 450 U. S., at 254. The presumption, having fulfilled its role of forcing the de-3 If the finder of fact answers affirmatively—if it finds that the prima facie case is supported by a preponderance of the evidence—it must find the existence of the presumed fact of unlawful discrimination and must, therefore, render a verdict for the plaintiff. See Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U. S. 248, 254, and n. 7 (1981); F. James & G. Hazard, Civil Procedure § 7.9, p. 327 (3d ed. 1985); 1 D. Louisell & C. Mueller, Federal Evidence § 70, pp. 568-569 (1977). Thus, the effect of failing to produce evidence to rebut the McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U. S. 792 (1973), presumption is not felt until the prima facie case has been established, either as a matter of law (because the plaintiff's facts are uncontested) or by the factfinder's determination that the plaintiff's facts are supported by a preponderance of the evidence. It is thus technically accurate to describe the sequence as we did in Burdine: "First, the plaintiff has the burden of proving by the preponderance of the evidence a prima facie case of discrimination. Second, if the plaintiff succeeds in proving the prima facie case, the burden shifts to the defendant to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employee's rejection." 450 U. S., at 252-253 (internal quotation marks omitted). As a practical matter, however, and in the real-life sequence of a trial, the defendant feels the "burden" not when the plaintiff's prima facie case is proved, but as soon as evidence of it is introduced. The defendant then knows that its failure to introduce evidence of a nondiscriminatory reason will cause judgment to go against it unless the plaintiff's prima facie case is held to be inadequate in law or fails to convince the factfinder. It is this practical coercion which causes the McDonnell Douglas presumption to function as a means of "arranging the presentation of evidence," Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U. S. 977, 986 (1988).
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