Cite as: 509 U. S. 502 (1993)
Opinion of the Court
fendant to come forward with some response, simply drops out of the picture. Id., at 255. The defendant's "production" (whatever its persuasive effect) having been made, the trier of fact proceeds to decide the ultimate question: whether plaintiff has proved "that the defendant intentionally discriminated against [him]" because of his race, id., at 253. The factfinder's disbelief of the reasons put forward by the defendant (particularly if disbelief is accompanied by a suspicion of mendacity) may, together with the elements of the prima facie case, suffice to show intentional discrimination. Thus, rejection of the defendant's proffered reasons will permit the trier of fact to infer the ultimate fact of intentional discrimination,4 and the Court of Appeals was correct when it noted that, upon such rejection, "[n]o additional proof of discrimination is required," 970 F. 2d, at 493 (emphasis added). But the Court of Appeals' holding that rejection of the defendant's proffered reasons compels judgment for the plaintiff disregards the fundamental principle of Rule 301 that a presumption does not shift the burden of proof, and ignores our repeated admonition that the Title VII plaintiff at all times bears the "ultimate burden of persuasion." See, e. g., Postal Service Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U. S. 711, 716 (1983) (citing Burdine, supra, at 256); Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U. S. 164, 187 (1989); Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U. S. 228, 245-246 (1989) (plurality opinion of Brennan, J., joined by Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens, JJ.); id., at 260 (White, J., concurring in judgment); id., at 270 (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment);
4 Contrary to the dissent's confusion-producing analysis, post, at 535- 536, there is nothing whatever inconsistent between this statement and our later statements that (1) the plaintiff must show "both that the reason was false, and that discrimination was the real reason," infra, at 515, and (2) "it is not enough . . . to disbelieve the employer," infra, at 519. Even though (as we say here) rejection of the defendant's proffered reasons is enough at law to sustain a finding of discrimination, there must be a finding of discrimination.
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