532
Souter, J., dissenting
(quoting this language from Burdine); 460 U. S., at 717-718 (Blackmun, J., joined by Brennan, J., concurring); see also Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U. S. 228, 287-289 (1989) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (discussing these "two alternative methods" and relying on Justice Blackmun's concurrence in Aikens). That the plaintiff can succeed simply by showing that "the employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of credence" indicates that the case has been narrowed to the question whether the employer's proffered reasons are pretextual.8 Thus, because Hicks carried his burden of persuasion by showing that St. Mary's proffered reasons were
as defined by the majority, see ante, at 515-516. These two efforts are intertwined, for Burdine tells us specifically how a plaintiff can prove either "pretext" or "pretext for discrimination": "either directly by persuading the court that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer or indirectly by showing that the employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of credence." 450 U. S., at 256 (emphasis added). The majority's chosen method of proving "pretext for discrimination" changes Burdine's "either . . . or" into a "both . . . and": "[A] reason cannot be proved to be 'a pretext for discrimination' unless it is shown both that the reason was false, and that discrimination was the real reason." Ante, at 515 (emphasis deleted). The majority thus takes a shorthand phrase from Burdine ("pretext for discrimination"), discovers requirements in the phrase that are directly at odds with the specific requirements actually set out in Burdine, and then rewrites Burdine in light of this "discovery." No one "[f]amiliar with our case law," ante, at 512, will be persuaded by this strategy.
8 That the sole, and therefore determinative, issue left at this stage is pretext is further indicated by our discussion in McDonnell Douglas of the various types of evidence "that may be relevant to any showing of pretext," 411 U. S., at 804, by our decision to reverse in Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U. S. 567 (1978), because the Court of Appeals "did not conclude that the [challenged] practices were a pretext for discrimination," id., at 578, and by our reminder in Burdine that even after the employer meets the plaintiff's prima facie case, the "evidence previously introduced by the plaintiff to establish a prima facie case" and the "inferences properly drawn therefrom may be considered by the trier of fact on the issue of whether the [employer's] explanation is pretextual," 450 U. S., at 255, n. 10.
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