St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 25 (1993)

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526

ST. MARY'S HONOR CENTER v. HICKS

Souter, J., dissenting

The McDonnell Douglas framework that the Court inexplicably casts aside today was summarized neatly in Burdine:

"First, the plaintiff has the burden of proving by the preponderance of the evidence a prima facie case of discrimination. Second, if the plaintiff succeeds in proving the prima facie case, the burden shifts to the defendant to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employee's rejection. Third, should the defendant carry this burden, the plaintiff must then have an opportunity to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the legitimate reasons offered by the defendant were not its true reasons, but were a pretext for discrimination." 450 U. S., at 252-253 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

We adopted this three-step process to implement, in an orderly fashion, "[t]he language of Title VII," which "makes plain the purpose of Congress to assure equality of employment opportunities and to eliminate those discriminatory practices and devices which have fostered racially stratified job environments to the disadvantage of minority citizens." 411 U. S., at 800. Because "Title VII tolerates no racial discrimination, subtle or otherwise," id., at 801, we devised a framework that would allow both plaintiffs and the courts to deal effectively with employment discrimination revealed only through circumstantial evidence. See Aikens, supra, at 716 ("There will seldom be 'eyewitness' testimony as to the employer's mental processes"). This framework has gained wide acceptance, not only in cases alleging discrimination on the basis of "race, color, religion, sex, or national origin" under Title VII, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-2, but also in similar cases, such as those alleging age discrimination under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967. See, e. g., Halsell v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 683 F. 2d 285, 289 (CA8 1982), cert. denied, 459 U. S. 1205 (1983); see also Brief

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