712
Opinion of Scalia, J.
435, 439, 442, 450 (1987). Although stare decisis is the "preferred course" in constitutional adjudication, "when governing decisions are unworkable or are badly reasoned, 'this Court has never felt constrained to follow precedent.' " Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U. S. 808, 827 (1991) (quoting Smith v. Allwright, 321 U. S. 649, 665 (1944), and collecting examples). We would mock stare decisis and only add chaos to our double jeopardy jurisprudence by pretending that Grady survives when it does not. We therefore accept the Government's invitation to overrule Grady, and Counts II, III, IV, and V of Foster's subsequent prosecution are not barred.17
V
Dixon's subsequent prosecution, as well as Count I of Foster's subsequent prosecution, violate the Double Jeopardy Clause.18 For the reasons set forth in Part IV, the other counts of Foster's subsequent prosecution do not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause.19 The judgment of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals is affirmed in part and reversed in part, and the case is remanded for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
"[t]he Supreme Court did not really develop any new law in Grady with respect to successive prosecutions," while dissent concludes that Grady requires reversal). Commentators have confirmed that Grady contributed confusion rather than certainty. See Poulin, Double Jeopardy Protection against Successive Prosecutions in Complex Criminal Cases: A Model, 25 Conn. L. Rev. 95 (1992); Thomas, A Modest Proposal to Save the Double Jeopardy Clause, 69 Wash. U. L. Q. 195 (1991).
17 We do not address the motion to dismiss the threat counts based on collateral estoppel, see Ashe v. Swenson, supra, because neither lower court ruled on that issue.
18 Justices White, Stevens, and Souter concur in this portion of the judgment.
19 Justice Blackmun concurs only in the judgment with respect to this portion.
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