Cite as: 509 U. S. 688 (1993)
Opinion of Rehnquist, C. J.
element of those substantive crimes. In short, the offenses for which Dixon and Foster were prosecuted in this case cannot be analogized to greater and lesser included offenses; hence, they are separate and distinct for double jeopardy purposes.3
The following analogy, raised by the Government at oral argument, see Tr. of Oral Arg. 8-9, helps illustrate the absurd results that Justice Scalia's Harris/Blockburger analysis could in theory produce. Suppose that the offense in question is failure to comply with a lawful order of a police officer, see, e. g., Ind. Code § 9-21-8-1 (Supp. 1992), and that the police officer's order was, "Don't shoot that man." Under Justice Scalia's flawed reading of Harris, the elements of the offense of failure to obey a police officer's lawful order would include, for purposes of Blockburger's same-elements test, the elements of, perhaps, murder or manslaughter, in effect converting those felonies into a lesser included offense of the crime of failure to comply with a lawful order of a police officer.
In sum, I think that the substantive criminal prosecutions in this case, which followed convictions for criminal con-3 Assuming, arguendo, that Justice Scalia's reading of Harris v. Oklahoma, 433 U. S. 682 (1977), is accurate, and that we must look to the terms of the particular court orders involved, I believe Justice Scalia is correct in differentiating among the various counts in Foster. The court order there provided that Foster must " 'not molest, assault, or in any manner threaten or physically abuse' " his estranged wife. App. to Pet. for Cert. 4a. For Foster to be found in contempt of court, his wife need have proved only that he had knowledge of the court order and that he assaulted or threatened her, but not that he assaulted her with intent to kill (Count V) or that he threatened to inflict bodily harm (Counts II-IV). So the crime of criminal contempt in Foster, even if analyzed under Justice Scalia's reading of Harris, is nonetheless a different offense under Block-burger v. United States, 284 U. S. 299 (1932), than the crimes alleged in Counts II-V of the indictment, since "each provision requires proof of a fact which the other does not." Id., at 304. Because Justice Scalia finds no double jeopardy bar with respect to those counts, I agree with the result reached in Part III-B of his opinion.
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