Cite as: 509 U. S. 688 (1993)
Opinion of White, J.
to overrule. Ante, at 704. I do not agree. Resolution of the question presented by Foster's case no more requires reliance on Grady than it points to reasons for reversing that decision. Rather, as I construe the Clause, double jeopardy principles compel equal treatment of all of Foster's counts. I dissent from the Court's holding to the contrary. Inasmuch as Grady has been dragged into this case, however, I agree with Justice Blackmun and Justice Souter that it should not be overruled. Post, at 741, 744. From this aspect of the Court's opinion as well, I dissent.
I
The chief issue before us is whether the Double Jeopardy Clause applies at all to cases such as these. Justice Scalia finds that it applies, but does so in conclusory fashion, without dealing adequately with either the Government's arguments or the practical consequences of today's decision. Both, in my view, are worthy of more.
A
The position of the United States is that, for the purpose of applying the Double Jeopardy Clause, a charge of criminal contempt for engaging in conduct that is proscribed by court order and that is in turn forbidden by the criminal code is an offense separate from the statutory crime. The United States begins by pointing to prior decisions of this Court to support its view. Heavy reliance is placed on In re Debs, 158 U. S. 564 (1895), but, as the majority notes, see ante, at 699, the relevant portion of the opinion is dictum—and seriously weakened dictum at that. See Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U. S. 194 (1968).
The Government also relies on two cases involving Congress' power to punish by contempt a witness who refuses to testify before it, In re Chapman, 166 U. S. 661 (1897), and Jurney v. MacCracken, 294 U. S. 125 (1935). Both cases appear to lean in the Government's direction, but neither is conclu-
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