182
Souter, J., concurring
Justice Souter, concurring.
I join the Court's opinion on the understanding that military judges, like ordinary commissioned military officers, are "inferior officers" within the meaning of the Appointments Clause. Because these cases would raise a far more difficult constitutional question than the one the Court today decides if, as petitioners argue, military judges were "principal officers," I write separately to explain why I conclude that they are not.
I
Under the Appointments Clause, the President "shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint" all "Officers of the United States" (or "principal officers," as we have called them, see Morrison v. Olson, 487 U. S. 654, 670 (1988); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, 132 (1976)). Art. II, § 2. "[B]ut the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments." Ibid.
Military officers performing ordinary military duties are inferior officers, and none of the parties to this case contends otherwise. Though military officers are appointed in the manner of principal officers, no analysis permits the conclusion that each of the more than 240,000 active military officers (see Department of Defense, Military Manpower Statistics 18 (Mar. 31, 1993) (Table 9)) is a principal officer. See Morrison v. Olson, supra, at 670-673 (outlining criteria for determining Appointments Clause status of a federal officer). Congress has simply declined to adopt the less onerous appointment process available for inferior officers.
The Uniform Code of Military Justice authorizes the Judge Advocate General of the relevant branch of the Armed Forces to select as a military judge any commissioned military officer who meets certain qualifications going to legal knowledge and experience. See ante, at 168. If, as peti-
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