Cite as: 510 U. S. 163 (1994)
Souter, J., concurring
thought appropriate in providing for the appointment of officers who, by definition, would have only inferior governmental authority. See 2 Farrand 627. But although they allowed an alternative appointment method for inferior officers, the Framers still structured the alternative to ensure accountability and check governmental power: any decision to dispense with Presidential appointment and Senate confirmation is Congress's to make, not the President's, but Congress's authority is limited to assigning the appointing power to the highly accountable President or the heads of federal departments, or, where appropriate, to the courts of law.
B
If the structural benefits the Appointments Clause was designed to provide are to be preserved, the Clause must be read to forbid the two ways in which the benefits can be defeated. First, no branch may aggrandize its own appointment power at the expense of another. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S., at 128-129. Congress, for example, may not unilaterally fill any federal office; and the President may neither select a principal officer without the Senate's concurrence, nor fill any office without Congress's authorization.2
2 While it is true that "the debates of the Constitutional Convention, and the Federalist Papers, are replete with expressions of fear that the Legislative Branch of the National Government will aggrandize itself at the expense of the other two branches," Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, 129 (1976), the Framers also expressed concern over the threat of expanding Presidential power, including specifically in the context of appointments. See, e. g., 1 Farrand 101 (G. Mason); id., at 103 (B. Franklin). Indeed, the Framers added language to both halves of the Appointments Clause specifically to address the concern that the President might attempt uni-laterally to create and fill federal offices. See C. Warren, The Making of the Constitution 642 (1937) (discussing references in the Appointments Clause to principal offices " 'established by Law,' " and to the power of appointing inferior officers which " 'Congress may by law' " vest as specified). No doubt, Article I's assignment to Congress of the power to make laws makes the Legislative Branch the most likely candidate for encroaching on the power of the others. But Article II gives the President means
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