Schiro v. Farley, 510 U.S. 222, 2 (1994)

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Cite as: 510 U. S. 222 (1994)

Opinion of the Court

sentencing proceeding following trial on the issue of guilt does not violate the Clause. The Court has also upheld the use of prior convictions to enhance sentences for subsequent convictions, even though this means a defendant must, in a certain sense, relitigate in a sentencing proceeding conduct for which he was previously tried. See, e. g., Spencer v. Texas, 385 U. S. 554, 560. In short, as applied to successive prosecutions, the Clause is written in terms of potential or risk of trial and conviction, not punishment. Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U. S. 430, 438, 446, distinguished. Pp. 229-232. 3. Nor does the doctrine of collateral estoppel require vacation of Schiro's death sentence. The Court does not address his contention that the doctrine bars the use of the "intentional" murder aggravating circumstance, because he has not met his burden of establishing the factual predicate for the application of the doctrine, namely, that an issue of ultimate fact has once been determined in his favor. See, e. g., Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U. S. 436, 443. Specifically, because an examination of the entire record shows that the trial court's instructions on the issue of intent to kill were ambiguous, and that uncertainty exists as to whether the jury believed it could return more than one verdict, the verdict actually entered could have been grounded on an issue other than intent to kill, see id., at 444, and, accordingly, Schiro has failed to demonstrate that it amounted to an acquittal on the intentional murder count. Pp. 232-236. 963 F. 2d 962, affirmed.

O'Connor, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, and Ginsburg, JJ., joined. Blackmun, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 237. Stevens, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Blackmun, J., joined, post, p. 239.

Monica Foster, by appointment of the Court, 508 U. S. 970, argued the cause for petitioner. With her on the briefs was Rhonda Long-Sharp.

Arend J. Abel, Deputy Attorney General of Indiana, argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Pamela Carter, Attorney General, and Matthew R. Gutwein and Wayne E. Uhl, Deputy Attorneys General.

Justice O'Connor delivered the opinion of the Court.

In this case we determine whether the Double Jeopardy Clause requires us to vacate the sentence of death imposed

223

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