236
Opinion of the Court
a reasonable doubt that it was done in the commission of a rape, and so that aggravating circumstance most likely exists in your mind." App. to Brief for Respondent 31-32.
Finally, we observe that a jury finding of intent to kill is entirely consistent with the evidence presented at trial. By Schiro's own admission, he decided to kill Laura Luebbehusen after she tried to escape and he realized she would go to the police. In addition, the physical evidence suggested a deliberate, rather than unintentional, accidental, or even reckless, killing. The victim was repeatedly beaten with a bottle and an iron; when she resisted, she was strangled to death.
We have in some circumstances considered jury silence as tantamount to an acquittal for double jeopardy purposes. Green v. United States, 355 U. S. 184, 190-191 (1957); Price v. Georgia, 398 U. S., at 329. The failure to return a verdict does not have collateral estoppel effect, however, unless the record establishes that the issue was actually and necessarily decided in the defendant's favor. As explained above, our cases require an examination of the entire record to determine whether the jury could have "grounded its verdict upon an issue other than that which the defendant seeks to fore-close from consideration." Ashe, 397 U. S., at 444 (internal quotation marks omitted). See also Dowling, 493 U. S., at 350. In view of Schiro's confession to the killing, the instruction requiring the jury to find intent to kill, and the uncertainty as to whether the jury believed it could return more than one verdict, we find that Schiro has not met his "burden . . . to demonstrate that the issue whose relitigation he seeks to foreclose was actually decided" in his favor. Ibid.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.
So ordered.
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