Cite as: 510 U. S. 222 (1994)
Stevens, J., dissenting
Justice Stevens, with whom Justice Blackmun joins, dissenting.
The jury found Thomas Schiro guilty of felony murder but not intentional murder. Thereafter, in a separate sentencing hearing, the same jury unanimously concluded that Schiro did not deserve the death penalty, presumably because he had not intended to kill.1 Nevertheless, without finding any aggravating circumstance, the trial judge overrode the jury's recommendation and sentenced Schiro to death. Months later, when the Indiana Supreme Court remanded the case to give the judge an opportunity to justify that sentence, the judge found that Schiro had intentionally killed his victim. That finding, like the majority's holding today, violated the central purpose of the Double Jeopardy Clause. After the issue of intent had been raised at trial and twice resolved by the jury, and long after that jury had been discharged, it was constitutionally impermissible for the trial judge to reexamine the issue. Because the death sentence rests entirely on that unauthorized finding, the law requires that it be set aside.
I
The Court devotes most of its opinion to a discussion of the facts. I cannot disagree that the gruesome character of the crime is significant. It is important precisely because it is so favorable to prosecutors seeking the death penalty.
1 Under Indiana's death penalty statute, the State may seek the death penalty for murder by proving beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of at least one statutory aggravating circumstance. Ind. Code § 35-50-2- 9(a) (Supp. 1978). The only aggravating circumstance at issue here was whether the defendant committed the murder by intentionally killing the victim while committing or attempting to commit rape or one of six other enumerated felonies. § 35-50-2-9(b)(1). When trial is by jury, the jury that convicted the defendant may recommend the death penalty only if it finds that the state proved beyond a reasonable doubt that at least one aggravating circumstance exists and that the aggravating circumstances outweigh any mitigating circumstances. § 35-50-2-9(e).
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