Cite as: 510 U. S. 266 (1994)
Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment
The principle of party presentation cautions decisionmakers against asserting it for him. See ante, at 275.
* * *
In Graham v. Connor, 490 U. S. 386 (1989), this Court refused to analyze under a "substantive due process" heading an individual's right to be free from police applications of excessive force. "Because the Fourth Amendment provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection against this sort of . . . governmental conduct," we said, "that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of 'substantive due process,' must be the guide for analyzing these claims." Id., at 395. I conclude that the Fourth Amendment similarly proscribes the police misconduct Albright alleges. I therefore resist in this case the plea "to break new ground," see Collins v. Harker Heights, 503 U. S. 115, 125 (1992), in a field—substantive due process—that "has at times been a treacherous [one] for this Court." See Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U. S. 494, 502 (1977) (opinion of Powell, J.).
Justice Kennedy, with whom Justice Thomas joins, concurring in the judgment.
I agree with the plurality that an allegation of arrest without probable cause must be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment without reference to more general considerations of due process. But I write because Albright's due process claim concerns not his arrest but instead the malicious initiation of a baseless criminal prosecution against him.
I
The State must, of course, comply with the constitutional requirements of due process before it convicts and sentences a person who has violated state law. The initial question here is whether the due process requirements for criminal proceedings include a standard for the initiation of a prosecution.
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