Cite as: 510 U. S. 266 (1994)
Souter, J., concurring in judgment
view that the applicability of one constitutional amendment pre-empts the guarantees of another"); Soldal v. Cook County, 506 U. S. 56, 70 (1992) ("Certain wrongs affect more than a single right and, accordingly, can implicate more than one of the Constitution's commands. Where such multiple violations are alleged, we are not in the habit of identifying as a preliminary matter the claim's 'dominant' character. Rather, we examine each constitutional provision in turn"). It has likewise rejected the view that incorporation of the substantive guarantees of the first eight Amendments to the Constitution defines the limits of due process protection, see Adamson v. California, 332 U. S. 46, 89-92 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting). The second Justice Harlan put it this way:
"[T]he full scope of the liberty guaranteed by the Due Process Clause . . . is not a series of isolated points . . . . It is a rational continuum which, broadly speaking, includes a freedom from all substantial arbitrary impositions and purposeless restraints . . . ." Poe v. Ullman, 367 U. S. 497, 543 (1961) (dissenting opinion).
We are, nonetheless, required by "[t]he doctrine of judicial self-restraint . . . to exercise the utmost care whenever we are asked to break new ground in [the] field" of substantive due process. Collins v. Harker Heights, 503 U. S. 115, 125 (1992). Just as the concept of due process does not protect against insubstantial impositions on liberty, neither should the "rational continuum" be reduced to the mere duplication of protections adequately addressed by other constitutional provisions. Justice Harlan could not infer that the due process guarantee was meant to protect against insubstantial burdens, and we are not free to infer that it was meant to be applied without thereby adding a substantial increment to protection otherwise available. The importance of recognizing the latter limitation is underscored by pragmatic concerns about subjecting government actors to two (potentially inconsistent) standards for the same conduct and needlessly
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