Cite as: 510 U. S. 266 (1994)
Stevens, J., dissenting
at the base of our civil and political institutions. Hebert v. Louisiana, 272 U. S. 312, 316, 317 [(1926)]. It is a requirement that cannot be deemed to be satisfied by mere notice and hearing if a State has contrived a conviction through the pretense of a trial which in truth is but used as a means of depriving a defendant of liberty through a deliberate deception of court and jury by the presentation of testimony known to be perjured. Such a contrivance by a State to procure the conviction and imprisonment of a defendant is as inconsistent with the rudimentary demands of justice as is the obtaining of a like result by intimidation." Id., at 112.
In the years since Mooney, we have consistently reaffirmed this understanding of the requirements of due process. Our cases make clear that procedural regularity notwithstanding, the Due Process Clause is violated by the knowing use of perjured testimony or the deliberate suppression of evidence favorable to the accused.15 It is, in
other words, well established that adherence to procedural forms will not save a conviction that rests in substance on false evidence or deliberate deception.
15 See, e. g., United States v. Agurs, 427 U. S. 97, 103, and n. 8 (1976) (citing cases); Giglio v. United States, 405 U. S. 150, 153-154 (1972) (failure to disclose Government agreement with witness violates due process); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U. S. 83, 87 (1963) ("[S]uppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution"); Napue v. Illinois, 360 U. S. 264 (1959) (failure of State to correct testimony known to be false violates due process); Pyle v. Kansas, 317 U. S. 213, 215-216 (1942) (allegations of the knowing use of perjured testimony and the suppression of evidence favorable to the accused "sufficiently charge a deprivation of rights guaranteed by the Federal Constitution, and, if proven, would entitle petitioner to release from his present custody"). But cf. United States v. Williams, 504 U. S. 36 (1992) (prosecutor need not present exculpatory evidence in his possession to the grand jury).
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