304
Stevens, J., dissenting
tion.20 Instead, the Court has identified numerous violations of due process that have no counterparts in the specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights. And contrary to the suggestion of the plurality, ante, at 271-272, 273, these decisions have not been limited to the realm outside criminal law. As I have already discussed, it is the Due Process Clause itself, and not some explicit provision of the Bill of Rights, that forbids the use of perjured testimony and the suppression of evidence favorable to the accused.21 Similarly, we have held that the Due Process Clause requires an impartial judge,22
and prohibits the use of unnecessarily suggestive identification procedures.23 Characteristically, Justice Black was the sole dissenter when the Court concluded in Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U. S. 333 (1966), that the failure to control disruptive influences in the courtroom constitutes a denial of due process.
Perhaps most important, and virtually ignored by the plurality today, is our holding in In re Winship that "the Due Process Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt." 397 U. S., at 364. Because the reasonable-doubt standard has no explicit textual source in the Bill of Rights, the Winship Court was faced with precisely the same argument now advanced by The Chief Justice and Justice Scalia: Noting the procedural guarantees for which the Bill of Rights specifically provides in criminal cases, Justice Black maintained that "[t]he Constitution thus goes into some detail to spell out what kind
20 Indeed, no other Justice has joined Justice Black in maintaining that the scope of the Due Process Clause is limited to the specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights. Although Justice Douglas joined Justice Black in dissent in Adamson, he later retreated from this position. See, e. g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U. S. 479, 484 (1965); L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 11-2, p. 774, and n. 32 (2d ed. 1988).
21 See n. 15, supra.
22 Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U. S. 510 (1927).
23 Stovall v. Denno, 388 U. S. 293, 302 (1967). Justice Black dissented. Id., at 303-306.
Page: Index Previous 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 NextLast modified: October 4, 2007