Department of Revenue of Ore. v. ACF Industries, Inc., 510 U.S. 332, 19 (1994)

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350

DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE OF ORE. v. ACF INDUSTRIES, INC.

Stevens, J., dissenting

signed to block other routes to the same end. In my opinion, it is anomalous to read § 11503(b) to prohibit even minor deviations in rates or assessments, but then to allow States to put manifestly disproportionate tax burdens on railroads by exempting most comparable property. Both the text of subsection (b)(4) and its evident purposes convince me that Congress intended to bar discrimination by any means, including exemptions.

In Davis v. Michigan Dept. of Treasury, 489 U. S. 803 (1989), this Court held that a State's exemption of a limited class of residents violated a general statutory prohibition against discriminatory taxation (4 U. S. C. § 111) that made no specific reference to exemptions. While I disagreed with the Court's conclusion that the limited exemption at issue could fairly be characterized as discrimination against the protected class, Davis surely demonstrates that an exemption, even if not expressly prohibited, may support the conclusion that a tax is discriminatory. Indeed, tax exemptions may make a tax unconstitutionally discriminatory. See, e. g., Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U. S. 263, 273 (1984); Armco Inc. v. Hardesty, 467 U. S. 638, 642-646 (1984). I see no reason why they should be totally ignored when Congress has expressly prohibited "discrimination" against a particular kind of interstate enterprise.

The Court puts great stock in the difference between the specific and strict bar against discriminatory tax rates and assessments in subsections (b)(1)-(3) and the open-ended language of subsection (b)(4), which speaks only tersely of "discriminat[ion]." As the Court explains, the definition of "commercial and industrial property" that is applicable to subsections (b)(1)-(3) is best read to embrace only property that is taxed, rather than exempted. If we were to accept the Carlines' position, the Court reasons, subsection (b)(4) would render the earlier provisions redundant and would "nullify" the limitations Congress placed on the rate and assessment provisions. Ante, at 343. I disagree.

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