Department of Revenue of Ore. v. ACF Industries, Inc., 510 U.S. 332, 22 (1994)

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Cite as: 510 U. S. 332 (1994)

Stevens, J., dissenting

prominently by the Commerce Clause itself. Subsection (b)(4) plainly requires States to readjust their tax arrangements to the extent those arrangements "discriminat[e]." I cannot agree that federalism "compels" us to read subsection (b)(4) as inapplicable to exemption arrangements. See ante, at 345.

Federalism concerns would weigh more heavily in favor of Oregon's position if, as the Court suggests, ante, at 344-345, reading subsection (b)(4) to apply to exemption schemes would require States to choose between exempting railroads or eliminating tax exemptions across the board. But as I have explained, such a reading is by no means required. Because the statutory term "discrimination" permits the States greater flexibility to employ exemptions than do the bans on disparate rates and assessments, the Court's concerns about imposing onerous choices on States are overstated.6 Moreover, an exemption that is meaningfully available to railroads—as in the Court's example of an exemption for funds spent on environmental cleanup—would not make a tax "discriminatory" merely because the exemption may be more useful for some other businesses than it is for railroads. Cf. Burlington Northern R. Co. v. Superior, 932 F. 2d 1185, 1187 (CA7 1991) (invalidating tax "imposed on an activity in which only a railroad or railroads engage").

The Court appears to hedge against its position that subsection (b)(4) flatly does not apply to taxes and exemption schemes that operate to burden railroads disproportionately. Thus, the Court intimates that the state ad valorem tax

6 The cases in which exemption schemes have been found unlawful under subsection (b)(4) certainly do not suggest any undue incursions into state fiscal policy. See, e. g., Trailer Train Co. v. Leuenberger, 885 F. 2d 415, 416 (CA8 1988) (violation found because State imposed ad valorem tax on railroad personal property but exempted over 75 percent of comparable property), cert. denied, 490 U. S. 1066 (1989); Burlington Northern R. Co. v. Bair, 766 F. 2d 1222, 1223-1224 (CA8 1985) (tax on railroad personal property coupled with exemption for 95 percent of other personal property violated statute).

353

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