John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Harris Trust and Sav. Bank, 510 U.S. 86, 27 (1993)

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88

JOHN HANCOCK MUT. LIFE INS. CO. v. HARRIS TRUST AND SAV. BANK

Syllabus

of benefits payable to retirement plan participants and their beneficiaries, as Hancock indisputably did with respect to certain GAC 50 benefits not at issue. As to a contract's free funds, the insurer must guarantee a reasonable rate of return on those funds and provide a mechanism to convert them into guaranteed benefits at rates set by the contract. While another contract, with a different set of features, might satisfy these requirements, GAC 50 does not; indeed, Hancock provided no real guarantee that benefits in any amount would be payable from the free funds. Pp. 101-106. (d) The Court declines to follow the Labor Department's view that ERISA's fiduciary obligations do not apply in relation to assets held by an insurer in its general account under contracts like GAC 50. The 1975 interpretive bulletin assertedly expressing this view did not originally have the scope now attributed to it, since it expressly addressed only a question regarding the scope of the prohibited transaction rules, and did not mention or elaborate upon its applicability to the guaranteed benefit policy exemption or explain how an unqualified exclusion for an insurer's general asset account can be reconciled with Congress' choice of a more limited ("to the extent that") formulation. Moreover, as of 1992, the Department apparently had no firm position to communicate, since it declined to file a brief in the Court of Appeals, citing the need to fully consider all of the implications of the issues. This Court will not accord deference to the Department's current view, since, by reading the statutory words "to the extent" to mean nothing more than "if," the Department has exceeded the scope of available ambiguity. Pp. 106-110.

970 F. 2d 1138, affirmed.

Ginsburg, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and Blackmun, Stevens, Scalia, and Souter, JJ., joined. Thomas, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which O'Connor and Kennedy, JJ., joined, post, p. 111.

Howard G. Kristol argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Robert M. Peak, Rosalie A. Hailey, and Richard J. J. Scarola.

Christopher J. Wright argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal. With him on the brief were Acting Solicitor General Bryson, Acting Deputy Solicitor General Kneedler, Judith E. Kramer, Allen H. Feldman, Nathaniel I. Spiller, and Elizabeth Hopkins.

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