Cite as: 511 U. S. 164 (1994)
Stevens, J., dissenting
the parties to address a question on which even the petitioner justifiably thought the law was settled, and reaches out to overturn a most considerable body of precedent.4
Many of the observations in the majority's opinion would be persuasive if we were considering whether to recognize a private right of action based upon a securities statute enacted recently. Our approach to implied causes of action, as to other matters of statutory construction, has changed markedly since the Exchange Act's passage in 1934. At that time, and indeed until quite recently, courts regularly assumed, in accord with the traditional common-law presumption, that a statute enacted for the benefit of a particular class conferred on members of that class the right to sue violators of that statute.5 Moreover, shortly before the Exchange Act was passed, this Court instructed that such "remedial" legislation should receive "a broader and more liberal interpretation than that to be drawn from mere dictionary definitions of the words employed by Congress." Piedmont & Northern R. Co. v. ICC, 286 U. S. 299, 311 (1932). There is a risk of anachronistic error in applying our current approach to implied causes of action, ante, at 176- 177, to a statute enacted when courts commonly read stat-4 "As I have said before, 'the adversary process functions most effectively when we rely on the initiative of lawyers, rather than the activism of judges, to fashion the questions for review.' New Jersey v. T. L. O., 468 U. S. 1214, 1216 (1984) (dissenting from order directing reargument)." Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 485 U. S. 617, 623 (1988) (Stevens, J., dissenting from order directing reargument).
5 See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U. S. 353, 374-378 (1982); Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea Clammers Assn., 453 U. S. 1, 22-25 (1981) (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part); California v. Sierra Club, 451 U. S. 287, 298-301 (1981) (Stevens, J., concurring). A discussion of the common-law presumption is found in Justice Pitney's opinion for the Court in Texas & Pacific R. Co. v. Rigsby, 241 U. S. 33, 39-40 (1916). See also, e. g., Texas & New Orleans R. Co. v. Railway Clerks, 281 U. S. 548, 568- 570 (1930).
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