Cite as: 511 U. S. 164 (1994)
Stevens, J., dissenting
The principle the Court espouses today—that liability may not be imposed on parties who are not within the scope of § 10(b)'s plain language—is inconsistent with long-established SEC and judicial precedent.
As a general principle, I agree, "the creation of new rights ought to be left to legislatures, not courts." Musick, Peeler, 508 U. S., at 291. But judicial restraint does not always favor the narrowest possible interpretation of rights derived from federal statutes. While we are now properly reluctant to recognize private rights of action without an instruction from Congress, we should also be reluctant to lop off rights of action that have been recognized for decades, even if the judicial methodology that gave them birth is now out of favor. Caution is particularly appropriate here, because the judicially recognized right in question accords with the longstanding construction of the agency Congress has assigned to enforce the securities laws. Once again the Court has refused to build upon a " 'secure foundation . . . laid by others,' " Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U. S. 164, 222 (1989) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting B. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process 149 (1921)).
I respectfully dissent.
n. 27 (CA9 1990) (en banc) (citing and following decisions to this effect from six other Circuits). See generally Kuehnle, 14 J. Corp. L., at 350- 376. These decisions likewise appear unlikely to survive the Court's decision. See ante, at 184.
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