232
Opinion of the Court
claimer for federal gift tax purposes. See id., at 996 (citing Hardenbergh v. Commissioner, 198 F. 2d 63 (CA8), cert. denied, 344 U. S. 836 (1952)); 981 F. 2d, at 998 (concurring opinion). Because Mrs. Irvine's disclaimer was indisputably valid under Minnesota law, the court held that the federal gift tax did not apply. Finally, the majority rejected the panel's analysis of retroactive application, indicating that taxation of the transfer effected by the disclaimer would violate the Act's prohibition of retroactive gift taxation. Id., at 994.
In a concurring opinion, id., at 996-998, Judge Loken also concluded the Regulation was inapplicable, not because of its limitation to "taxable transfers," but because it is limited to interests in "property transferred from a decedent . . . by the decedent's will or by the law of descent and distribution," whereas the Ordway trust came from an inter vivos transfer. Judge Loken shared the majority view, however, that because the Regulation was inapplicable, the federal gift tax consequences of the disclaimer were a function of state law. The dissent took the position of the majority in the panel opinion, and of the Eleventh Circuit in Ordway v. United States, supra. See 981 F. 2d, at 998-1002.
The conflict prompted us to grant certiorari to determine whether a disclaimer made after enactment of the gift tax statute, of an interest created before enactment, is necessarily free of any consequent federal gift taxation. 508 U. S. 971 (1993). We hold that it is not, and reverse.
II
The Internal Revenue Code of 1986 taxes "the transfer of property by gift," 26 U. S. C. § 2501(a)(1),7 "whether the transfer is in trust or otherwise, whether the gift is direct or indirect, and whether the property is real or personal, tangible or intangible," § 2511(a).8 We have repeatedly em-7 See n. 2, supra.
8 See n. 3, supra.
Page: Index Previous 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 NextLast modified: October 4, 2007