Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 29 (1994)

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Cite as: 511 U. S. 1 (1994)

Opinion of Blackmun, J.

tion." Id., at 361. The Court explained that any "society that values the good name and freedom of every individual should not condemn a man for commission of a crime when there is a reasonable doubt about his guilt." Id., at 363-364.

Despite the inherent appeal of the reasonable-doubt standard, it provides protection to the innocent only to the extent that the standard, in reality, is an enforceable rule of law. To be a meaningful safeguard, the reasonable-doubt standard must have a tangible meaning that is capable of being understood by those who are required to apply it. It must be stated accurately and with the precision owed to those whose liberty or life is at risk. Because of the extraordinarily high stakes in criminal trials, "[i]t is critical that the moral force of the criminal law not be diluted by a standard of proof that leaves people in doubt whether innocent men are being condemned." Id., at 364.

When reviewing a jury instruction that defines "reasonable doubt," it is necessary to consider the instruction as a whole and to give the words their common and ordinary meaning. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U. S. 62, 72 (1991). It is not sufficient for the jury instruction merely to be susceptible to an interpretation that is technically correct. The important question is whether there is a "reasonable likelihood" that the jury was misled or confused by the instruction, and therefore applied it in a way that violated the Constitution. Boyde v. California, 494 U. S. 370, 380 (1990). Any jury instruction defining "reasonable doubt" that suggests an improperly high degree of doubt for acquittal or an improperly low degree of certainty for conviction offends due process. Either misstatement of the reasonable-doubt standard is prejudicial to the defendant, as it "vitiates all the jury's findings," see Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U. S. 275, 281 (1993) (emphasis deleted), and removes the only constitutionally appropriate predicate for the jury's verdict.

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