Cite as: 511 U. S. 1 (1994)
Opinion of Blackmun, J.
"substantial doubt" language in Cage had nothing to do with the absence of appropriate contrasting language; rather, the Court condemned the language for precisely the reason it gave: "[T]he words 'substantial' and 'grave,' as they are commonly understood, suggest a higher degree of doubt than is required for acquittal under the reasonable doubt standard." Id., at 41. In short, the majority's speculation that the jury in Victor's case interpreted "substantial" to mean something other than "that specified to a large degree" simply because the word "substantial" is used at one point to distinguish mere conjecture is unfounded and is foreclosed by Cage itself.
The majority further attempts to minimize the obvious hazards of equating "substantial doubt" with reasonable doubt by suggesting that, in Cage, it was the combined use of "substantial doubt" and "grave uncertainty," "in parallel," that rendered the use of the phrase "substantial doubt" unconstitutional. Ante, at 20. This claim does not withstand scrutiny. The Court in Cage explained that both "substantial doubt" and "grave uncertainty" overstated the degree of doubt necessary to acquit, and found that it was the use of those words in conjunction with the misleading phrase "moral certainty" that violated due process. The Court's exact words were:
"It is plain to us that the words 'substantial' and 'grave,' as they are commonly understood, suggest a higher degree of doubt than is required for acquittal under the reasonable doubt standard. When those statements are then considered with the reference to 'moral certainty,' rather than evidentiary certainty, it becomes clear that a reasonable juror could have interpreted the instruction to allow a finding of guilt based on a degree of proof below that required by the Due Process Clause." 498 U. S., at 41.
Clearly, the Court was not preoccupied with the relationship between "substantial doubt" and "grave uncertainty." The
33
Page: Index Previous 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 NextLast modified: October 4, 2007