Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244, 52 (1994)

Page:   Index   Previous  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  Next

Cite as: 511 U. S. 244 (1994)

Blackmun, J., dissenting

shall take effect upon enactment." Under the "settled rule that a statute must, if possible, be construed in such fashion that every word has operative effect," United States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 503 U. S. 30, 36 (1992), citing United States v. Menasche, 348 U. S. 528, 538-539 (1955), § 402(a)'s qualifying clause, "[e]xcept as otherwise specifically provided," cannot be dismissed as mere surplusage or an "insurance policy" against future judicial interpretation. Cf. Gersman v. Group Health Assn., Inc., 975 F. 2d 886, 890 (CADC 1992). Instead, it most logically refers to the Act's two sections "specifically provid[ing]" that the statute does not apply to cases pending on the date of enactment: (a) § 402(b), 105 Stat. 1099, which provides, in effect, that the Act did not apply to the then-pending case of Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U. S. 642 (1989), and (b) § 109(c), 105 Stat. 1078, which states that the Act's protections of overseas employment "shall not apply with respect to conduct occurring before the date of the enactment of this Act." Self-evidently, if the entire Act were inapplicable to pending cases, §§ 402(b) and 109(c) would be "entirely redundant." Kungys v. United States, 485 U. S. 759, 778 (1988) (plurality opinion). Thus, the clear implication is that, while §§ 402(b) and 109(c) do not apply to pending cases, other provisions—including § 102— do.1 " 'Absent a clearly expressed legislative intention to the contrary, [this] language must . . . be regarded as conclusive.' " Kaiser, 494 U. S., at 835, quoting Consumer Product Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U. S., at 108. The legislative history of the Act, featuring a welter of conflicting and "some frankly partisan" floor statements, ante, at 262, but no committee report, evinces no such contrary

1 It is, of course, an "unexceptional" proposition that "a particular statute may in some circumstances implicitly authorize retroactive [application]." Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hospital, 488 U. S. 204, 223 (1988) (concurring opinion) (emphasis added).

295

Page:   Index   Previous  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  Next

Last modified: October 4, 2007