296
Blackmun, J., dissenting
legislative intent.2 Thus, I see no reason to dismiss as "unlikely," ante, at 259, the most natural reading of the statute, in order to embrace some other reading that is also "possible," ante, at 260.
Even if the language of the statute did not answer the retroactivity question, it would be appropriate under our precedents to apply § 102 to pending cases.3 The well-established presumption against retroactive legislation, which serves to protect settled expectations, is grounded in a respect for vested rights. See, e. g., Smead, The Rule Against Retroactive Legislation: A Basic Principle of Jurisprudence, 20 Minn. L. Rev. 775, 784 (1936) (retroactivity
2 Virtually every Court of Appeals to consider the application of the 1991 Act to pending cases has concluded that the legislative history provides no reliable guidance. See, e. g., Gersman v. Group Health Assn., Inc., 975 F. 2d 886 (CADC 1992); Mozee v. American Commercial Marine Service Co., 963 F. 2d 929 (CA7 1992).
The absence in the Act of the strong retroactivity language of the vetoed 1990 legislation, which would have applied the new law to final judgments as well as to pending cases, see H. R. 4000, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., § 15(b)(3) (1990), reprinted at 136 Cong. Rec. H6829 (Aug. 3, 1990) (providing that "any final judgment entered prior to the date of the enactment of this Act as to which the rights of any of the parties thereto have become fixed and vested . . . shall be vacated in whole or in part if justice requires" and the Constitution permits), is not instructive of Congress' intent with respect to pending cases alone. Significantly, Congress also rejected language that put pending claims beyond the reach of the 1990 or 1991 Act. See id., at H6747 (Michel-LaFalce amendment to 1990 Act) ("The amendments made by this Act shall not apply with respect to claims arising before the date of enactment of this Act"); id., at H6768 (Michel-LaFalce amendment rejected); 137 Cong. Rec. S3023 (daily ed. Mar. 12, 1991) (Sen. Dole's introduction of S. 611, which included the 1990 Act's retroactivity provision); id., at 13255, 13265-13266 (introduction and defeat of Michel substitute for H. R. 1).
3 Directly at issue in this case are compensatory damages and the right to a jury trial. While there is little unfairness in requiring an employer to compensate the victims of intentional acts of discrimination, or to have a jury determine those damages, the imposition of punitive damages for preenactment conduct represents a more difficult question, one not squarely addressed in this case and one on which I express no opinion.
Page: Index Previous 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 NextLast modified: October 4, 2007