40
Syllabus
the term of probation. The statutory language appears to differentiate, not to equate or amalgamate, "the sentence of probation" and "the original sentence." The Government's interpretation, furthermore, reads the proviso's word "sentence" inconsistently. Pp. 44-47. (b) Under Granderson's reading of the proviso, the "original sentence" that sets the duration of the revocation sentence is the applicable Guidelines sentence of imprisonment, not the revoked term of probation. That reading avoids both the linguistic anomalies presented by the Government's construction and the sentencing disparities that would attend the Government's interpretation. Furthermore, contrary to the Government's arguments, Granderson's reading satisfies the statute's purpose by treating the class of drug possessors more severely than other probation violators, and the proviso need not be interpreted in pari materia with the discrete, differently worded provision prescribing revocation of the supervised release of drug possessors. Moreover, the proviso's history furnishes additional cause to resist the Government's interpretation, for it indicates that the proviso may not have received Congress' careful attention and may have been composed with an obsolete federal sentencing regime in the drafters' minds. In these circumstances, where the text, structure, and statutory history fail to establish that the Government's position is unambiguously correct, the rule of lenity operates to resolve the statutory ambiguity in Grander-son's favor. Pp. 47-54. (c) The benchmark for the revocation sentence under the proviso is the maximum Guidelines sentence of imprisonment. Pp. 54-56. (d) Because Granderson's maximum revocation sentence under the proviso was 6 months, and because he had already served 11 months imprisonment at the time the Court of Appeals issued its decision, that court correctly ordered his release. Pp. 56-57.
969 F. 2d 980, affirmed.
Ginsburg, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Blackmun, Stevens, O'Connor, and Souter, JJ., joined. Scalia, J., post, p. 57, and Kennedy, J., post, p. 60, filed opinions concurring in the judgment. Rehnquist, C. J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Thomas, J., joined, post, p. 69.
Thomas G. Hungar argued the cause for the United States. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Days, Acting Assistant Attorney General Keeney, and Deputy Solicitor General Bryson.
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